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In re Walsh and Pollard: Designing a Way Around
U.S. Immigration Policy
I. Introduction
The United States provides a favorable visa status' to particular
foreign investors who wish to enter the U.S. labor force and maintain
their nonimmigrant status. 2 The E-2 visa allows a foreign investor or
its employee to work in the United States without fear of quota re-
strictions3 or the obligation to pay U.S. taxes on worldwide income. 4
The United States benefits from job opportunities expanded through
this foreign investment.5
Although the E classification smacks of an open-door policy, it is
I The favorable option referred to is the E-2 visa, also known as the treaty investor
visa. A "treaty investor" is defined as:
[A]n alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the
provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States
and the foreign state of which he is a national . . . (ii) solely to develop and
direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an en-
terprise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial
amount of capital.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1988).
2 There are actually two treaty visas. The E- I treaty trader visa is provided to aliens
who wish to engage in substantial trade that is principally between the United States and
the treaty country. Id. § 1101 (a)(15)(E)(i). See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
Aliens seeking treaty trader or treaty investor status must be nationals 6f one of the follow-
ing nations having treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the United
States:
I. El and E2 Eligibility:
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China (Taiwan), Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ethiopia, France, Germany (FRG), Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Spain, Suriname, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, United King-
dom, Yugoslavia.
2. E-I Eligibility Only:
Bolivia, Brunei, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel,
Latvia, Turkey.
DEPT. OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.51, Exhibit 1 (1988) [hereinafter cited as
F.A.M.]. The nationality of a firm is determined by the nationality of those owning at least
50 % of the stock of the corporation regardless of the place of incorporation. The nation-
ality of small business companies is determined by the nationality of those owning the
principal amount of the business. Id. § 41.51 N3. 1. For a comparison of the E- I and E-2
visas, see Fragomen & Robosson, The Foreign Investor: Current Approaches Toward United
States Immigration Law, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 347-50 (1985).
3 See 1 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 12.01 (rev.
ed. 1989).
4 Fragomen & Robosson, supra note 2, at 341.
5 Id. at 345. The State Department indicates that one way an applicant may establish
eligibility for treaty investor status is by showing "that the investment will expand job
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subject to limitations. Before entering the United States under this
classification, an investor must first establish that his domestic invest-
ment is substantial, 6 not marginal, 7 and that any employees brought
over to establish the new enterprise must possess supervisory skills
or "special qualifications ' 8 essential to the enterprise and which can-
not be obtained from the U.S. labor force. These limitations echo
the congressional concern that the U.S. labor force be free from any
threat of foreign competition.9
Prior to 1988, the "special qualifications" requirement for E-2
classification did not exist.10 The advent of this new category in the
recodified regulations added a new consideration to the analysis of
whether an investment was substantial enough for treaty investor sta-
tus. In re Walsh and Pollard I1 was the first case dealing with this new
immigration issue. This Note examines whether the holding in that
case was true to the goals of immigration policy.
II. Background of In re Walsh and Pollard
Applicants Walsh and Pollard were British automotive designers
employed by the British automotive design firm IAD Modern Design,
Ltd. (IAD, Ltd.).12 The designers came to the United States pursu-
ant to a contract between IAD, Ltd. and General Motors Corporation
(GM) for the purpose of redesigning GM's line of cars in a "smaller,
more European fashion."'13 GM required the services of foreign spe-
cialists because of a nationwide shortage of qualified domestic auto-
motive designers. 14 The designers were assigned to work on GM
projects at Hydra-matic, a GM subsidiary in Michigan. 15 IAD, Ltd.
paid the designers at an hourly rate with a daily living allowance plus
bonuses, which GM reimbursed to IAD, Ltd. by purchase order at a
higher hourly rate. 16 To facilitate and expand contract relations be-
opportunities locally." 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.4. The State Department, however, does not
provide guidance as to what constitutes sufficient local job expansion.
6 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1) (1989).
7 Id.
8 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (1989).
9 See In re Udagawa, 14 I & N Dec. 578 (Bd. Imm. App. [hereinafter BIA] 1974). The
BIA stated that "[i]n section 212(a) (14) of the Immigration & Nationality Act... Congress
has evinced a desire to protect American labor from excessive job competition which
might be generated by the presence in the United States of numerous skilled and unskilled
laborers." Id. at 580. For further discussion of the legislative policy behind the treaty
investor visa, see Note, The Treaty Investor Visa: Cure or Band Aid for the Ills of Foreign Inves-
tors?, 15J. LEGIS. 45 (1988).
10 In 22 C.F.R. § 41.41(a) (1987), it was provided that an employee of a treaty inves-
tor could receive E-2 classification only if he were hired in a "responsible capacity."
I I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 (BIA 1989).
12 Id. at 2.
'3 Id.





tween the British firm and U.S. automobile manufacturers, IAD, Ltd.
formed a Michigan corporation, IAD Modern Design, Inc. (IAD,
Corp.), a wholly owned subsidiary of IAD, Ltd.' 7 IAD, Corp. subse-
quently rented office space, purchased office furniture, hired two
U.S. citizens to assist the British designers in their relocation and
established a corporate bank account of $15,000.18
Walsh and Pollard sought admission to the United States as em-
ployees of a nonimmigrant treaty investor under the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.19 The U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) sought exclusion of these aliens, contending
that the British employer had not made a substantial investment in
the United States as required by the Act.20 INS contended that a
minimum dollar amount was required to meet the substantiality
test.2 ' INS further contended that the employees of the treaty inves-
tor were not coming to the United States to "develop and direct" the
investment as required by the Act. 2 2 The Chief Immigration Judge
rejected INS' contentions and terminated the exclusion proceed-
ings.2 3 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Chief
Judge's decision and dismissed the appeal. 24
The BIA rejected INS' argument that the British firm had not
invested the minimum dollar amount necessary to meet the substan-
tiality test, noting that no minimum dollar investment requirement
was "published or reflected in any written material." 25 To establish
the substantiality of the British firm's investment, the BIA applied
the proportionality26 and marginality2 7 tests proposed by the De-
partment of State. Under the two-pronged proportionality test, the
amount invested is weighed against 1) the total value of the enter-
prise, or 2) the amount normally considered necessary to establish a
viable enterprise of the nature contemplated. 28 Under the marginal
enterprise test, the amount invested must reap more than a mere
17 Id.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
(1988)).
20 I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 4.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 14.
25 Id. at 11. Although there is no express or explicit statutory language requiring a
minimum dollar amount, the State Department has established the arbitrary criterion that
an investor must invest at least one-half of the business' value. See State Department Cable
(Mar. 13, 1982), noted in Fragomen, supra note 1, at 345 n.41; see, e.g., A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL
RAY & S. BELL, 1989 IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 183 (1989) (recommending
$100,000 as an absolute minimum for investment).
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livelihood for the investor.2 9 Finding lAD, Ltd.'s investment suffi-
cient to establish a profitable and viable business in the United
States, the BIA held that the British firm had met the requirements
of a treaty investor under the second prong of the proportionality
test.30 The BIA further held that because the firm expected substan-
tial revenues from its investment it was not engaged "in a marginal
enterprise solely for the purpose of earning a living." 3 1
The BIA flatly rejected INS' contention that Walsh and Pollard
should be excluded on the ground that they were not coming to "de-
velop and direct" the investment of the treaty investor, citing the
new regulation which allows classification of an employee as E-2 if
"the employee has special qualifications that make the services to be
rendered essential to the efficient operation of the enterprise. '3 2
Noting that the older of the two designers had over thirty years of
design experience and that the younger one possessed "unique"
computer expertise, the BIA had no difficulty establishing the aliens'
special qualifications.3 3 Basing its decision upon these considera-
tions the BIA allowed Walsh and Pollard admission to the United
States.34
III. Applicable Immigration Laws
The treaty investor and treaty trader visas derive their name
from the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered
into by the United States and certain foreign nations.3 5 Pursuant to
the purposes of these treaties nationals of these countries are eligible
for favorable E-visa status. The E-2 visa differs from the E-1 visa in
that the former is granted to aliens entering the United States to in-
vest a substantial amount of capital,3 6 while the latter is granted to
those aliens entering to engage in substantial trade between the
United States and their home country.3 7 The E-2 visa is also the only
nonimmigrant category based solely upon investment.3 8 The great
advantage of the E-2 visa is that it "affords the investor the opportu-
nity to enter the United States, manage his investment, compensate
29 Id. N5.4.
3o In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 12.
31 Id. at 12-13.
32 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (1989).
33 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 13.
34 Id. at 14.
35 See supra note 1.
36 See supra note 18.
37 A "treaty trader" is defined as:
[A]n alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the
provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States
and the foreign state of which he is a national .. .(i) solely to carry on sub-
stantial trade, principally between the United States and the foreign state of
which he is a national.
8 U.S.C. § 1 l01(a)(15)(E)(i) (1988).
38 Fragomen & Robosson, supra note 2, at 340.
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himself with any salary he deems appropriate, and avoid United
States taxation on worldwide income by remaining outside the
United States for enough days not to qualify as a resident for tax
purposes." '3 9 Another advantage is the absence of any requirement
to file a petition with the INS prior to receiving E status. 40 Instead,
the alien submits documentation directly to the consular office.4 ' E-
2 classification may then be renewed yearly subject to review by the
consular office. 42 The treaty investor's spouse and minor children
are allowed to enter the United States under the same classification
regardless of their nationality. 43 As an additional incentive to for-
eign investors, E-2 status does not require that the alien maintain a
residence abroad. 44 All that is required is a present expression of an
intent to return home when the visa expires. 45
Before receiving E-2 status an alien must submit substantial sup-
porting documentation to satisfy the consular officer that he qualifies
under the Act.46 This documentation must clearly establish the fol-
lowing: (1) the enterprise or firm has the nationality of the treaty
country; (2) the applicant intends to depart when E status termi-
nates; (3) the investment involved is substantial; (4) the applicant has
invested or is actively in the process of investing; (5) the enterprise is
a real and operating commercial enterprise; (6) the investment is
more than a marginal one solely for earning a living; (7) the appli-
cant is in a position to "develop and direct" the enterprise; and (8) if
the applicant is an employee of a treaty investor, the applicant is
qualified as a manager or a highly trained and specially qualified em-
ployee. 47 If the evidence fails to establish any one of these elements,
then the applicant is denied E-2 status.
It is critical that the alien establish that he has invested or is ac-
tively in the process of investing a substantial amount of capital in a
bona fide enterprise in the United States. Capital involved in the
investment process must be placed at commercial risk in hopes of
generating a return.48 Mere possession of uncommitted funds in a
bank account does not qualify,49 although a reasonable amount of
cash held in a bank account to be used for routine business purposes
39 Id. at 341.
40 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b) (1989).
41 1 C. GORDON & G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE: PRACTICE AND
STRATEGY § 37.05 (1989); 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b) (1988).
42 8 C.F.R. 2 14.2(e) (1989).
43 22. C.F.R. § 41.51(d).
44 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N3.2.
4 5 Id.
46 For an inventory of required and suggested documentation, see C. GORDON & G.
GORDON, supra note 41, § 37.05.
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might be counted as investment funds.50 Payments for leases and
purchases of property or equipment may be used in calculating the
investment.5 1
Further, the enterprise must be "real and commercially active,
producing some service or commodity.' '5 2 It cannot be a "paper or-
ganization or an idle speculative investment held for potential appre-
ciation in value .... ",53 When a new enterprise is the object of the
investment the investor faces a greater burden of establishing the
investment's validity; mere intent to invest will not establish treaty
investor status.54 It has been argued that "[t]he safest course of ac-
tion for the alien investor is to form a corporation or other legal
entity, rent premises, employ, contingently employ or show plans to
employ persons from the domestic labor force, and place the capital
in an account under the name of the corporation. ' 55
To test the substantiality of the investment, the Department of
State has propounded a "proportionality test," in which the consular
officer weighs the amount invested against either: 1) the total value
of the enterprise in question, or 2) the amount normally considered
necessary to establish a viable enterprise of the nature contem-
plated.56 Only one of these criteria need be satisfied in order to es-
tablish a "substantial investment."' 57 The first criterion involves
weighing evidence of the actual value of an established business. 58
Establishing the proportion of the investment to the total value of
the enterprise is an important step in determining whether the appli-
cant has a controlling interest in the enterprise. "An interest of 50
percent or less usually will mean that the applicant does not have the
requisite control, particularly in small enterprises. ' 59 Purchase price
or tax valuation are recommended evidence of investment value.60
The second criterion is more difficult to assess. In this case the con-
sular officer is directed to draw upon her personal knowledge of the
50 Id. See In re Kung, 17 I & N Dec. 260 (Comm. 1980) (where evidence showed
applicant had available an additional $46,000 in reserve funds, it could not be said that he
had invested in a marginal business solely for the purpose of earning a living); In re Lee, 15
I & N Dec. 187 (BIA 1975) (applicant denied admission where there was no evidence that
applicant had the financial ability to make an additional $35,000 investment in the
enterprise).




55 Fragomen & Robosson, supra note 2, at 344.
56 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.3-1.
57 Id.
58 Id. N5.3-2.
59 Id. N5.5. See Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1986) (case remanded for con-
sideration of whether applicant owned over 60% of the enterprise); In re Lee, 15 I & N
Dec. 187 (Reg. Comm. 1975) (applicant failed to show an ability to invest additional capi-
tal in order to bring his investment to 51% of the enterprise).
60 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.3-2.
IMMIGRATION LAW .
U.S. business scene in order to evaluate whether the proposed in-
vestment is reasonable by U.S. standards. 6' This is most often the
case where a new business enterprise is being formed. 62
An applicant for treaty investor status must also prove that he is
not investing in a marginal enterprise solely for the purpose of earn-
ing a living.63 The applicant may establish this requirement with a
showing that the investment will expand job opportunities in the lo-
cal area or by showing that the investment was sufficient to ensure
that the applicant's primary function will not be that of a skilled or
unskilled laborer.64 This is best established when the applicant has
substantial income from other sources and does not depend upon
the investment enterprise for a livelihood.65 Better stated, this prop-
osition means that "the return on the investment, rather than the
amount invested, and the likelihood that the investment will tend to
expand job opportunities in the domestic labor market are indicia of
the substantiality of the investment."'66
The treaty investor is not the only alien eligible for E-2 classifi-
cation. E-2 status may be granted to an employee of a treaty investor
provided that the applicant qualifies as a manager or a highly trained
and specially qualified employee. 67 Before approving an applicant's
employee on the executive or supervisory ground the consular of-
ficer should consider the following factors: the applicant's position
and duties, the degree of control and responsibility the applicant will
61 The notes to the Foreign Affairs Manual indicate that this test is subjective:
[E]valuating the investment in relation to the amount normally considered
necessary to establish a viable enterprise is less susceptible to precise calcula-
tion. Here the consular officer must draw on personal knowledge of the U.S.
business scene to judge whether the amount the alien proposes to invest is
reasonable for that type of business. If in doubt, the consular offices may seek
additional evidence to help establish what would be a reasonable amount.
Such evidence may include letters from chambers of commerce or statistics
from trade associations.
Id. The Code of Federal Regulations offers no additional guidance to the consular officer:
(b) Treaty investor. An alien is classifiable as a nonimmigrant treaty investor
(E-2) if the consular officer is satisfied that the alien qualifies under the provi-
sions of INA 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) and that the alien:
(1) Has invested or is actively in the process of investing a substantial
amount of capital in a bonafide enterprise in the United States, as distinct
from a relatively small amount of capital in a marginal enterprise solely for
the purpose of earning a living; and
(2) Intends to depart from the United States upon the termination of E-2
status.
22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1989). For further discussion of the highly subjective nature of this
test, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
62 See In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 12; 9 F.A.M. § 41.51
N5.3-1.
63 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.4.
64 Id.
65 Id. See In re Kung, 17 1 & N Dec. 260 (Comm. 1980) (evidence showed applicant
had an additional $46,000 in reserve funds on which to draw).
66 Fragomen & Robosson, supra note 2, at 345.
67 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N3.4-2 to N3.4-3.
1990]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
exercise, the number and skill levels of the applicant's subordinates,
the level of pay, and the applicants supervisory experience. 68 Fur-
ther, the consular officer must ensure that the position is a "principal
and primary function" and not an "incidental or collateral func-
tion."6 9 Positions requiring key supervisory responsibility for a large
section of firm operations with only minimal routine staff work gen-
erally qualify for E-2 status.70 Positions requiring primarily routine
work with incidental supervision of low-level employees would not
qualify. 71
Prior to the recodification of the regulations, treaty investors did
not have the "special qualifications" option. 72 The former regula-
tion only allowed an employee employed in a "responsible capacity"
to be classified E-2. 73 Now the consular officer must consider "the
degree of proven expertise of the alien in the area of specialization,
the uniqueness of the specific skills, the length of experience and
training with the firm, the period of training needed to perform the
contemplated duties, and the salary the special expertise can
command.'' 74
The standards for supervisory personnel and specially qualified
personnel are the same except for personnel needed for the "start-
up" of an enterprise. 75 These start-up employees "derive their es-
sentiality from their familiarity with the overseas operation rather
than the nature of their skills."' 76 This is usually the case where an
established foreign firm attempts to enlist foreign specialists to es-
tablish its U.S. operation, usually for a period of up to a year.77
Highly trained and specially qualified personnel may be classi-
fied as E-2 as long as they are employed by the treaty investor to
train or supervise personnel employed in manufacturing, mainte-
nance, and repair functions, and the treaty investor establishes that it
cannot obtain the services of qualified U.S. technicians. 78 There is,
however, a presumption that the treaty investor will train U.S. work-
ers within a reasonable time to replace the alien technicians. 79 It is
the duty of the consular officer to remind the treaty investor of this
obligation when it becomes apparent that the treaty investor is re-





72 See 22 C.F.R. § 41.41(a) (1987).
73 Id.









IV. Treaty Investor Cases
One obvious concern throughout the regulations is to prevent
the circumvention of the "congressional policy of protecting Ameri-
can labor from undesirable job competition." 8' That concern is
echoed in cases examining the admission of treaty investors into the
United States prior to the decision in Walsh.8 2 Whenever the judicial
body felt that the U.S. labor force was threatened, the applicant was
denied admission.
Receitly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Choi v. INS,83
examined a proposed partnership agreement between Lee, a native
of Korea and nationalized citizen of the United States, and Choi, a
citizen of Korea.8 4 The agreement called for Choi to invest $40,000
to open and manage an oriental gift shop in Springfield, Missouri.8 5
When Choi's initial treaty investor status expired at the end of a year,
he applied to extend his temporary stay.8 6 The District Director of
the INS denied the application on the ground that Choi did not
solely develop and direct the operation of the enterprise.8 7 The
Eighth Circuit remanded the matter to the INS for failure to consider
other evidence of Choi's income when analyzing Choi's controlling
interest in the enterprise.8 8 The Eighth Circuit stated that "in light
of the complexity involved in analyzing the 'develop and direct issue'
[i]t is clear that the alien's actual control over the business affairs
of that enterprise is a key element."8 9
Degree of control was also an issue in In re Kung.9 0 The appli-
cant, a Chinese national, purchased a franchise restaurant in Califor-
nia for $53,000. 9 1 Previously classified as a nonimmigrant student
under F-1 status, the applicant now sought a change to treaty inves-
tor status. 92 The District Director denied this change on grounds
that Kung failed to show his investment represented more than a
small amount of capital in a marginal enterprise and that Kung failed
to demonstrate an ability to control the enterprise. 93 Noting that
81 In re Udagawa, 14 I & N Dec. 578, 582 (BIA 1974).
82 See, e.g., Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Kung, 17 I & N Dec. 260
(Comm. 1980); In re Nago, 16 I & N Dec. 446 (BIA 1978); In re Lee, 15 I & N 187 (Reg.
Comm. 1975); In re Udagawa, 14 I & N Dec. 578 (BIA 1974); In re Tamura, 10 1 & N Dec.
717 (Reg. Comm. 1964); In re Kobayashi and Doi, 10 1 & N Dec. 425 (Dep. Assoc. Comm.
1963).
83 798 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1986).
84 Id. at 1190.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1191.
88 Id. at 1193.
89 Id.
90 17 1 & N Dec. 260 (Comm. 1980).
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Kung had produced evidence that he had an additional $46,000 in
reserve funds, the Commissioner rejected the Director's first asser-
tion by stating "[i]t can hardly be said that such a person has in-
vested in a marginal business solely to earn a living."'94 Addressing
the question of control, the Commissioner held that although there
were certain limiting factors imposed by the franchise agreement,
they were overshadowed by nonlimiting factors allowing the appli-
cant control of his enterprise. 95
In Kung, the District Director's conclusion that the applicant had
not demonstrated an ability to control his investment was based in
part on "the fact that the enterprise was a franchised restaurant...
and that the franchiser . .. imposed strict conditions on the fran-
chisee . .. that effectively reduced the degree of control over the
operation of the restaurant to the point where the applicant could
not develop and direct the enterprise. '9 6 The Commissioner re-
jected these allegations, finding that any "limiting factors imposed
[on] the franchisee to develop, direct, and protect his investment are
overshadowed by the nonlimiting factors." 9 7
The limiting factors considered by the Commissioners were:
1. 3.5 percent of the gross sales must be expanded in advertising.
2. The franchisee must use only the batter mix provided by
franchiser.
3. The franchisee may sell only those products approved by the
franchiser.
4. The franchiser may terminate for default of the agreement and
thereafter has the option of purchasing the business.9 8
In considering the nonlimiting factors, the Commissioner noted that
the franchisee received the full benefit from the local advertising
mandated by the first condition. 9 Despite the second requirement
that the batter mix must be provided by the franchisee, the Commis-
sioner found that all other services, supplies, products, fixtures, or
any other goods could be purchased on the open market. !00 The
Commissioner also found that the third condition did not restrict the
franchisee's retail pricing of these products, nor did it preclude the
franchisee's submission of new or different products for approval to
the franchiser.' 0 ' Finally, the Commissioner found that the fran-
chisee could prevent default by correcting any infringement during a
94 Id. at 262.
95 Id. at 263-64. The Regional Commissioncr in Kung found "no fault with the pre-
cept set forth in In re Lee ... that an investor must show that he has the ability to control
the investment, thereby fulfilling that part of the definition of a treaty investor contained in
section 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the Act." Id. at 262.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 263-64.






fifteen-day grace period.'t0 2 Further, since the franchise appeared
freely transferable to a third party as evidenced by the applicants in-
stant purchase, it appeared that the franchisee had the right of first
refusal only.' 0 3 The Commissioner cited additional favorable factors
that were instrumental in his decision. These factors included the
franchisee's powers to hire and fire employees, set wage scales, and
set business hours.10 4
Both Choi 105 and Kung 10 6 cite In re Lee' 0 7 for the proposition
that "[i]n order for an investor to develop and direct the operations
of an enterprise, it must be shown that he has a controlling interest;
otherwise, other individuals who do have the controlling interest are
in a position to dictate how the enterprise is to be developed and
directed."' 1 8 In Lee, the evidence indicated that the applicant had
invested only $10,000 in a restaurant valued at $64,000.109 The ap-
plicant asserted that at some unspecified time in the future he would
increase his investment to $35,000 and, as a result, he would have a
controlling interest in the enterprise."i 0 Noting that there was a lack
of evidence supporting the applicant's financial ability to make the
additional investment, the Regional Commissioner found Lee's con-
tention that he would have a controlling interest in the enterprise
"too speculative," and denied Lee admission."I '
Other cases involving E-2 classification have dealt with the ad-
missibility of employees of the treaty investor who are employed in a
"responsible capacity." These cases have dealt exclusively with the
admission of Oriental restaurant personnel." 12 In In re Nago, 13 the
BIA granted admission to a highly trained chef brought to the
United States to enable other employees to become proficient in
"Nabemono" cooking because he was employed in a responsible ca-
pacity."l 4 In In re Tamura,115 the Regional Commissioner granted
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 264.
105 Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Lee, 15 I & N Dec.
187, 189 (Reg. Comm. 1975)).
106 In re Kung, 17 1 & N Dec. 260, 262 (Comm. 1980) (quoting In re Lee, 15 1 & N Dec.
187, 189 (Reg. Comm. 1975)).
107 15 I & N Dec. 187 (Reg. Comm. 1975).
108 Id. at 189.
109 Id. at 190.
110 Id.
'I Id.
112 See In re Nago, 16 I & N Dec. 446 (BIA 1978); In re Udagawa, 14 I & N Dec. 578
(BIA 1974); In re Tamura, 10 1 & N Dec. 717 (Reg. Comm. 1964); In re Kobayashi and Doi,
10 I & N Dec. 425 (Dep. Assoc. Comm. 1963).
113 16 I & N Dec. 446 (BIA 1978).
114 Id. at 448. The BIA considered the following facts in their determination of
whether the applicant was to serve in a responsible capacity:
The applicant will cook in the "Nabemono" style and train other employees
of the restaurant in this form of cooking. It appears that "Nabemono" chefs
are scarce in the United States and that the applicant's employer has been
1990]
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admission to a Japanese chef on the same grounds.' 1 6 Two addi-
tional cases, however, arrived at different conclusions in circum-
stances similar to Nago and Tamura.' 17
The Deputy Associate Commissioner in In re Kobayashi and
Doi" 8 denied E status to two restaurant employees." t 9 Applicant
Kobayashi was to train and supervise entertainers in Japanese art,
culture, and tradition.' 20 Doi was to instruct the wait staff in the art
of preparing and serving Japanese foods.' 2 ' Despite the applicants'
expertise the Deputy Commissioner denied admission based upon
the determination that the record was devoid of any evidence tend-
ing to show that the applicants had even "slight experience in the
managerial or executive field."' 22
The applicant in In re Udagawa 123 was a chef specializing in the
preparation ofJapanese tempura meals. 24 Recognizing that the de-
nial of Udagawa's application was in conflict with the Tamura hold-
ing, 12 5 the BIA was nonetheless convinced "that Congress did not
intend that skilled alien laborers or aliens occupying minor manage-
rial posts should be eligible for treaty investor status."' 2 6 The BIA
searching for such a chef for several years. The applicant's employer testified
that the applicant is a graduate of a leading Japanese cooking school and
experienced in the art of "Nabemono" cooking. The applicant's employer
also testified that the applicant will teach other employees to carry on the
"Nabemono" style of cooking; that the "Nabemono" process can be learned
in one year, and that the applicant intends to return to Japan after one year.
Id. at 447.
115 10 1 & N Dec. 717 (Reg. Comm. 1964).
116 The Regional Commissioner based his determination on the following:
The applicant herein is engaged as chief cook by Japanese nationals who
have invested substantial sums of money in establishing a restaurant known
for its excellent Japanese cuisine. He was brought to the United States by his
employers because of his skill in the preparation of Japanese dishes. He is
not only charged with the responsibility of supervising several subordinate
cooks in preparing fried food specialties but also performs the duties of the
main kitchen chef in the latter's absence.
Id. at 718.
117 See In re Udagawa, 14 I & N Dec. 578 (BiA 1974) (Japanese chef); In re Kobayashi
and Doi, 10 I & N Dec. 425 (Dep. Assoc. Comm. 1963) (Japanese restaurant personnel).
118 10 I & N Dec. 425 (Dep. Assoc. Comm. 1963).
119 Id. at 427.
120 Id. at 426.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 14 I & N Dec. 578 (BIA 1974).
124 The BIA noted the applicant's relevant qualifications:
The applicant appears to have had at least one full year of schooling and
two years' practical experience as a cook. During the last six months of his
work experience in Japan he had specialized as a tempura chef and had su-
pervised the activities of several other cooks. The applicant had been ex-
pected to remain in the United States for as long as two years, during which
time he was to supervise and train American workers as tempura cooks and
was to assist in the preparation of meals at the restaurant.
Id. at 578-79.
125 Id. at 582.
126 Id. at 581.
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further held that "[s]killed alien employees should be required to
enter in a non-immigrant status that will afford some measure of pro-
tection to American labor."' 27
Udagawa echoes the regulatory presumption that a treaty inves-
tor will train U.S. workers within a reasonable time to replace the
alien technicians.' 28 The BIA expressed concern over admitting an
applicant to a status which might result in a limitless visit to the
United States. 12 9 If the applicant was to be admitted, the BIA held
that "it must be via a category which would not utterly circumvent
the congressional policy of protecting American labor from undesir-
able job competition.") 3 0
V. Analysis
Preventing the circumvention of congressional policy is the pre-
vailing concern in the cases prior to Walsh. These cases, however,
had only the "responsible capacity" criterion by which to gauge the
admissibility of an alien employee. With the advent of the recodified
regulations in 1988, a new category of "specially qualified" alien
could be granted E-2 status. 13' Further, prior cases generally in-
volved small investment enterprises.' 32 These cases did not have to
broach the issue of whether a large multinational design firm's plan
to import specialized labor into the United States to fulfill contract
obligations with large U.S. automotive manufacturers constituted a
substantial investment. Because Walsh is a case of first impression on
these issues, its impact on congressional and immigration policy
bears further examination.
Of the two issues discussed in Walsh, the issue of "substantial
investment" is the most critical. Failure to establish this requirement
would preclude any discussion of employees with "special qualifica-
tions" because IAD, Ltd. would not qualify as a treaty investor. Be-
cause the enterprise involved in this case was newly formed, the BIA
made its determination based upon an application of the second
prong of the proportionality test, weighing the amount .of the invest-
ment against the amount normally considered necessary to establish
a viable enterprise of this nature.13 3 With little explanation, the BIA
stated that a large investment was not needed to establish a viable
.127 Id.
128 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N3.4-3(d).
129 The BIA was concerned that the yearly renewal provision found in 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(e) could "be designed to allow a treaty investor an indefinite stay." 14 I & N Dec.'
at 581 n.3.
130 Id. at 582.
131 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (1989).
132 See supra note 82. With the exception of Choi, which involved a gift shop, all of
these cases concerned individually owned restaurants.
133 I & N Interim Dec. 3111 at 12.
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business of this kind.' 3 4 The BIA held that evidence showing that
the enterprise had incorporated in Michigan, rented offices and
purchased office furniture, hired U.S. citizens as employees, estab-
lished a corporate bank account, and did business for the parent
company was sufficient indication that the investment accomplished
its purpose. 13 5
Admittedly, "evaluating the investment in relation to the
amount normally considered necessary to establish a viable enter-
prise is less susceptible to precise calculation."' 136 The Visa Office
grants a great deal of discretion to the Consular Officer's "common
sense" and personal knowledge of the U.S. business scene in the de-
termination of whether an enterprise is viable or not. 137 Unfortu-
nately, this is an entirely subjective decisionmaking process. The
process provides no objective standards for the BIA to review an ap-
peal, nor does it provide any clear guidelines for the INS to apply
when reviewing applications.
The only check on this broad grant of discretion is the Consular
Officer's duty to ensure that "applicants are not, in truth, seeking to
circumvent the numerical limitations on immigrants."' 138 Nowhere
in its laconic discussion of the viability prong of the proportionality
test does the BIA apply this check to Walsh. Had the BIA done so, it
would have arrived at the conclusion that a plan to import hundreds
of foreign designers circumvented the numerical limitations on im-
migrants. To establish the viability prong of the proportionality test,
the BIA should have required IAD, Ltd. to show that it not only had
invested enough money to start up the enterprise, but also had com-
mitted funds sufficient to provide for the training of U.S. personnel
to eventually replace the foreign designers. 139
The BIA also should have reached a different conclusion when it
applied the "marginal enterprise" test. 140 Applying a very narrow
interpretation of the test to the facts of the case, the Board concen-
trated on the language excluding aliens who receive only enough re-
turn on their investment to earn a living. 14 1 Noting from past
experience in supplying designers for automobile firms, IAD, Ltd.
expected substantial revenues far above a living wage, and noting
that the chief economist in the Michigan Department of Commerce
134 Id.
135 Id.; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
136 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.3-2; see supra note 61.
137 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.3-2.
138 Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 5
VISA OFFICE BULLETIN No. 20, TREATY INVESTOR GUIDELINES, n.25, reprinted in 59 INT. REL.
264 (1982)); see In re Udagawa, 14 1 & N Dec. 578, 582 (1974); see also supra notes 123-130
and accompanying text.
IS9 See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
140 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.4.
141 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 12-13.
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expected the investment to expand job opportunities, the BIA held
that IAD, Corp. was not a marginal enterprise.142 The Board unfor-
tunately emphasized the wrong standard in this case, however. The
key concern is not whether a return exceeds an individual applicant's
living wage, but whether the return on the corporate investment is
marginal. When the drafters of the regulations emphasized "living
wage,""43 they apparently did so in response to the large number of
cases treating the exclusion of individual treaty investors.' 44
If the BIA had applied a corporate standard of marginality to the
facts of this case, lAD, Ltd. would arguably have failed to establish its
status as a treaty investor. Purchase orders that reimburse the hourly
compensation of an employee's services at a higher rate"4 5 ought not
constitute a "substantial" investment return within the purview of
the regulations. The corporate return in this case is merely a skim
off the top of the employee's hourly compensation, and the only way
it can reach a substantial level is through the increased importation
of foreign personnel. Further, testimony by an economist that the
investment would expand job opportunities"46 loses probative value
when it is apparent that the openings would be filled by support per-
sonnel for the 300 specialists IAD, Ltd. plans to import over the next
few years. 14 7 There is nothing wrong with hiring these support per-
sonnel, but it would be more consistent with U.S. policy if they were
hired to support U.S. designers trained for positions currently held
by foreign personnel. Otherwise, the expanded job opportunities
for nonskilled personnel hardly compensate for the several hundred
skilled positions denied to U.S. citizens.
Another factor the BIA failed to consider was the risk involved
with the investment. "If the applicant has substantial income from
other sources and does not rely on the investment enterprise to pro-
vide a living, the investment may be one of risk and not one of providing a
mere livelihood." 148 The Department of State expounds on this asser-
tion: "The concept of investment connotes the placing of funds or
other capital assets at risk in the commercial sense in the hope of
generating a return of the funds risked."' 14 9 Funds that are not sub-
ject to partial or total loss are not investments in the sense intended
by the Act.150 For example, if the automotive tastes of the U.S. pub-
142 Id.
143 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.4.
144 See supra note 82.
145 The BIA did not discuss the difference between the billed hourly rate and the
purchase rate.
146 I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 13.
147 See id. at 3. lAD, Corp. expressed no future intention of hiring or training any U.S.
designers for use in the enterprise.
148 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.4 (emphasis added).
149 Id. § 41.51 N5.1-1.
150 Id.
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lic changed overnight and GM decided to end its contract with IAD,
Ltd., the British firm would only suffer a nominal loss on its invest-
ment. They would conceivably lay off or bring back the designers,
terminate their lease, sell the furniture, close out the corporate bank
accounts, and dissolve the Michigan corporation. Ironically, the ap-
parent investment made by this corporation is less than some invest-
ments made by individual applicants to whom E classification has
been denied, and it was proportionately much less of a risk. 1 1 The
thrust of this regulatory scheme is that an investor must feel the
smart of a loss on an investment, otherwise the investment should be
classified as marginal-not substantial.
The BIA also failed to consider whether IAD, Ltd. would "de-
velop and direct" the enterprise. 152 While the Board was correct
when it held that the "develop and direct" requirement did not apply
to IAD's employees, it erred by not applying the requirement to the
treaty investor. The emphasis of the "develop and direct" require-
ment is not strictly on who has the majority ownership, but on who
has "operational control."' 53 There is no doubt that IAD, Ltd. has
majority ownership-IAD, Corp. is its wholly owned subsidiary. 15 4
The question is whether their majority interest grants them opera-
tional control of foreign investment.15
In light of the Kung holding, operational control of a design firm
like IAD, Corp. would seem to imply that control over design
projects and design personnel is necessary to fulfill the "develop and
direct" requirement. 156 IAD, Corp. apparently exercises very little
control over its design personnel. The designers are assigned to a
GM subsidiary to work on GM projects, 157 most likely, according to
GM production schedules. This indicates some degree of creative
control by GM, but exactly how much control is imposed by the con-
ditions of the agreement between GM and IAD, Corp. was not dis-
cussed by the BIA. The BIA also ignored GM's leverage in
negotiating the hourly wages of the designers. The BIA should have
considered these potentially limiting factors in their determination
that IAD, Ltd. exercised operational control over its investment.
Although the BIA was correct in its decision that employees of
the treaty investor need not fill a supervisory position in order to
receive E status, it nonetheless failed to consider adequately the rela-
151 See Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1986) ($40,000 needed to open and man-
age a gift shop); In re Kung, 17 I & N Dec. 260 (Comm. 1980) (applicant invested $53,000
as sole owner of a franchised restaurant).
152 See 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N5.5 (requires that the treaty investor be in a position to
develop and direct the investment).
153 Id.
154 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 3.
155 See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
157 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 3.
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tionship between the investment and the treaty investor's "specially
qualified" employees. Specially qualified employees do not gain ac-
cess to the United States merely to set the stage for a future invasion
of foreign specialists. "[Tihe presumption is that the firm will train
U.S. workers in a reasonable period of time to replace the foreign
technicians."' 5 8 When it becomes apparent that the firm is request-
ing additional visas for foreign specialists, the consular officer is to
remind the firm of its obligation to train U.S. citizens for this
work. 159 This presumption was contradicted by the Visa Office in its
replies to interrogatories from the petitioners in Walsh.' 60 Because
the Visa Office's interpretations of the regulations were accorded
"great deference" in the BIA's analysis of the case' 6 ' they require
close scrutiny.
The Visa Office stated that it did not consider the number of
applicants to be significant because "all visa applicants would have to
satisfy the requirement of being either an executive/manager or be-
ing an essential employee to the efficient operation of the enter-
prise."' 162 The Visa Office defended its reasoning by stating that
"[t]he proper and normal operation of those tests would control the
number of persons contemplated by the treaty provisions."'163
Notwithstanding the normal and proper operation of those tests, no
evidence of an intent to control this number of persons is found in
Walsh. The BIA indicated that as IAD, Corp. contract commitments
expanded, so would the number of foreign designers coming to the
United States. 164
The Visa Office asserted that there was no "absolute require-
ment" to train domestic labor in the skills of an essential em-
ployee.' 6 5 The Visa Office qualified this by stating "[t]here is an
implicit requirement to train only if the skills are of a nature condu-
cive to transfer to the local labor market," and that "[slome skills are
not readily transferred, and therefore, remain essential to the effi-
cient operation of the business for an indefinite period of time."' 66
Using this rationale, the Visa Office could have arrived at a different
result and found error in the issuance of the E-2 visas. If the skills
described in Walsh can be acquired by hundreds of foreign designers,
then they can be readily acquired by domestic engineers.' 6 7
158 9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N3.4-3(d).
159 Id.
160 C. GORDON & G. GORDON, supra note 41, App. 37C-15.
161 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 11.
162 C. GORDON & G. GORDON, supra note 41, App. 37C at 12.
163 Id.
164 "IAD, Ltd. expects in the future to bring as many as 300 designers and other re-
lated workers to the United States to meet the demands of United States automotive man-
ufacturers." In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 3.
165 C. GORDON & G. GORDON, supra note 41, App. 37C at 15.
166 Id.
167 The Sixth Circuit in a case factually kindred to Walsh noted: "The reputed 'qualifi-
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Under the foregoing analysis, IAD, Ltd. begins to look more like
a foreign employment agency than a treaty investor. This was pre-
cisely INS' contention in Walsh.' 68 Under remarkably similar facts,
the Sixth Circuit in Sussex Engineering Ltd. v. Montgomery, 169 labeled
such firms as IAD, Ltd. "specialized temporary service agencies."' 70
Sussex Engineering was a British "professional design and engineer-
ing firm specializing in providing design and engineering personnel
under contract to various automotive manufacturers,"' 7'1 one of
which was GM. Sussex Engineering petitioned the INS office in De-
troit for H-2 classifications for three alien automotive design engi-
neers who were to work temporarily designing car body interiors at a
GM Tech Center in Michigan.1 72 Conceding that there was a dearth
of qualified U.S. automotive designers,' 73 the Sussex court nonethe-
less upheld the district director's denial of the petitions on the
grounds that the need for the alien design engineers was ongoing
rather than temporary.174
The H classification discussed in Sussex differs essentially from
the E classification in its temporal nature. While an alien classified as
H-2 may only enter the United States to perform temporary services
or labor,' 75 the E-2 treaty investor may conceivably remain in the
United States for a limitless amount of time. 176 Despite this differ-
ence, the ongoing need for foreign designers was a concern in both
Sussex and Walsh. In Sussex, the ongoing need for foreign labor ran
contrary to the plain language of the Act. 177 In Walsh, the plan to
import hundreds of foreign engineers over time ran contrary to the
cations' for a senior design engineer are a two-year associates's degree and five to seven
years experience as a draftsman. A four-year bachelor's degree allegedly makes an indi-
vidual overqualified." Sussex Engineering Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1086 (6th
Cir. 1987). The Sussex court also noted that General Motors had initiated a community
college program in 1980 to bolster the domestic pool of qualified labor. Id. They ex-
pected the first class of 50 domestic design engineers to become available later in the
decade. Id. General Motor's initiation of this program is an indication that these skills are
of a nature conducive to transfer to the local market. The progress of this training pro-
gram was unfortunately not discussed in either the BIA's opinion in Walsh or in the Visa
Office's replies to interrogatories.
168 In re Walsh and Pollard, I & N Interim Dec. No. 3111 at 5.
169 825 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1987).
170 General Motors had been using British design engineers, employed by specialized
temporary service agencies and entering the country on H-2 visas to work pursuant to one-





175 An H-2 alien is defined as "an alien having a residence in a foreign country which
he has no intention of abandoning... who is coming temporarily to the United States...
to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed persons capable of performing
such service or labor cannot be found in this country .... ".8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (1988).
176 See supra note 129 and accompanying text; 22 C.F.R. § 214.2(e).
177 825 F.2d at 1089.
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immigration policy requiring that this need be satisfied by training
U.S. personnel. 178 As long as GM and other U.S. automotive manu-
facturers can import foreign engineers by the hundreds, there is little
incentive to establish training programs for domestic engineers in
order to alleviate the shortage.
VI. Conclusion
Before granting E-2 status to IAD, Corp., the BIA should have
reminded the firm of its obligation to train U.S. residents. As evi-
dence that the firm would fulfill its obligation, the BIA could have
required the firm to implement a plan to train domestic engineers
and then invest substantial capital into the program. Under such a
program, the firm could continue to import foreign designers until
enough domestic designers were trained to meet the requirements of
the firm's contracts with U.S. automotive manufacturers. This would
be the most certain indication that the firm was not merely a tempo-
rary employment agency, but a substantial treaty investor.
Although the BIA's decision in Walsh has opened a new door for
foreign investments in the United States, it has also opened a door
through which foreign employment agencies masquerading as treaty
investors can flood specialized foreign labor into the U.S. labor force
while reaping the benefits of their nonimmigrant investor status.
Walsh confounds the proposition that "skilled employees should be
required to enter in a nonimmigrant status which affords some mea-
sure of protection to American labor."' 179 Firms that have been de-
nied H status now have a way to skirt the holding in Sussex merely by
incorporating in the United States. The potential for abuse is great.
Absent a revision to the regulations which specifically addresses this
new issue in the law, the problem can only be remedied by judicial
consideration that is mindful of legislative purpose on a case-by-case
basis. 80 Until then, U.S. labor remains susceptible to the designs of
clever foreign draftsmen.
PHILLIP KEVIN WOODS
178 The Foreign Affairs Manual states that:
[T]he presumption is that the firm will train U.S. workers in a reasonable
period of time to replace the foreign technicians. If it is apparent that the
employing firm is repeatedly requesting visas for foreign technicians, the
consular officer should remind the firm that it has an obligation to train U.S.
residents for this work and that the absence of effective training programs
will be a negative factor in examining future visa applications for such for-
eign technicians.
9 F.A.M. § 41.51 N3.4-3(d).
179 In re Udagawa, 14 1 & N Dec. 578, 581 (BIA 1974).
180 Kun Young Kim v. District Director, 586 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1978).
1990]

